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OFFICIAL TIMEOUT ON THE FIELD: CRITICS HAVE
THROWN A RED FLAG AND ARE CHALLENGING
THE NFL’S TAX-EXEMPT STATUS, CALLING
FOR IT TO BE REVOKED
“If they quack like a profit-making entity and waddle like a profit-making
entity, they should be taxed like a profit-making entity.”
– John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has come
under fire for allegedly targeting particular groups and organiza-
tions that were applying for federal tax-exempt status.2  Most of the
highly publicized controversies have regarded 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions, which are more commonly referred to as civic leagues or so-
cial welfare organizations.3  Specifically, the allegations claimed
that the IRS singled out groups applying for 501(c)(4) tax-exempt
status whose names sounded too political in nature.4  These
targeted groups were then subject to extra scrutiny to determine if
they actually qualified for tax-exempt status, given that such groups
may not engage in political activities as their primary purpose.5  Al-
though these controversies have yet to be fully resolved, they have
1. John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Article, Exempt Organizations: A Study of
Their Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 AKRON TAX J.
223, 230-31 (1996).
2. See Doug Farrar, The U.S. Senate May – and Should – Review the NFL’s Tax-
Exempt Status, YAHOO SPORTS (May 21, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-
shutdown-corner/congress-may-review-nfl-tax-exempt-status-004521453.html (ex-
plaining that IRS has recently faced allegations of targeting groups seeking tax-
exempt status).
3. See Dylan Matthews, Everything You Need to Know About the IRS Scandal in One
FAQ, WASHINGTON POST (May 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/05/14/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-irs-scandal-in-
one-faq/ (discussing IRS scandal of 2013, where IRS targeted groups applying for
tax-exempt status, especially 501(c)(4) applicants).
4. See id. (suggesting IRS targeted applications from organizations whose
names implied that organizations’ activities were primarily political).
5. See id. (explaining that extra scrutiny from IRS likely came about because
501(c)(4) organizations may only lobby/organize and may not “interven[e] in
ongoing political campaigns,” and overly politically-sounding names may have
called into question the associated organization’s activities).
(577)
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578 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 577
reignited the debate about the utility and fairness of the IRS’s poli-
cies for granting organizations tax-exempt status.6
When people think of tax-exempt organizations, they most
often think of charities and other foundations or organizations that
provide a public service or public good.7  For example, when peo-
ple hear “tax-exempt organization,” they often think of entities
such as the American Red Cross.8  As it turns out, however, the In-
ternal Revenue Code (IRC), which codifies the federal tax law, en-
ables a much broader array of organizations to receive tax-exempt
status.9
Section 501(c) of the IRC identifies the types of organizations
that can receive tax-exempt status.10  Currently, there are twenty-
nine different types of tax-exempt entities identified in that sec-
tion.11  Included are the aforementioned 501(c)(4)’s, as well as
charities, educational, and religious organizations; all three of
which are labeled 501(c)(3) organizations.12  Other entities one
may expect to see listed are corporations organized by Acts of Con-
gress, such as Federal Credit Unions, which are classified as
501(c)(1) organizations.13  And then there is the 501(c)(6) exempt
category for “business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate
boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues.”14
Yes, that is correct, “[s]ection 501(c)(6) specifically mentions
professional football” as a type of organization that can receive tax-
exempt status.15  And, yes, this means exactly what you think – the
6. See Brent Schrotenboer, To Tax or Not? The NFL’s Relationship with the IRS,
USA TODAY (May 30, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2013/
05/29/nfl-sports-leagues-irs-tax-exemption/2370945/ (explaining how IRS contro-
versies have given rise to debates regarding “fairness of the tax code and questions
about whether some groups are worthy of tax exemptions”).
7. See Aarthi Manohar, Take a Hike! Why the NFL Shouldn’t Enjoy Tax-Exempt
Status, MOORAD SPORTS L.J. BLOG (Jan. 12, 2013), http://lawweb2009.law.villanova
.edu/sportslaw/?p=1446 (discussing common perceptions and examples of “tax-
exempt” and “non-profit” organizations).
8. See Kristi Dosh, Examining NFL’s Tax-Exempt Status, ESPN.COM (June 4,
2013), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9342479/examining-nfl-tax-exempt-
status-challenged-us-senator-tom-coburn (citing American Red Cross as organiza-
tion that many people may assume to be tax-exempt).
9. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2011) (outlining twenty-nine types of tax-exempt
entities).
10. See id. (identifying and describing twenty-nine types of tax-exempt
entities).
11. See id. (outlining twenty-nine types of tax-exempt entities).
12. See id. (defining 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) tax-exempt entities).
13. See id. (defining 501(c)(1) tax-exempt entities).
14. Id. (defining 501(c)(4) tax-exempt entities).
15. Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing exemption afforded to “professional foot- R
ball leagues” under 501(c)(6)).
2
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2014] CHALLENGING THE NFL’S TAX EXEMPT STATUS 579
National Football League (“NFL” or the “League”) is a tax-exempt
organization.16  However, to be fair, the “NFL” in this context, and
throughout this Comment, is referring to the entity that is the NFL
League Office, and not the collection of the thirty-two NFL teams.17
Moreover, before one compares the NFL to the American Red
Cross, it is also important to note that there are different standards
for obtaining tax-exempt status under each of the IRC’s enumer-
ated types of tax-exempt categories.18  Furthermore, “in no way is
the NFL claiming to be a charity.”19  Instead, the NFL claims to be
“a not-for-profit organization” “whose primary purpose is to further
the industry or profession it represents.”20  Specifically, the NFL as-
serts that it is a trade or industry organization and should be treated
as such under the tax law.21
Even considering these caveats, however, many people are still
quite surprised to learn that the NFL is tax-exempt.22  It simply does
16. See id. (discussing that NFL is tax-exempt organization under 501(c)(6)).
17. See id. (discussing comments from NFL league spokesman regarding
NFL’s tax-exempt status).  Brian McCarthy, league spokesman for the NFL, pro-
vided details regarding the NFL’s tax-exempt status when he stated that only the
NFL League Office is tax-exempt and that the revenues distributed to the teams
are taxed at the team level. See id.  The teams that currently make up the League
are all for-profit entities. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 186-88 (2010)
(detailing basic organizational structure of NFL); see also Michael A. McCann, Fea-
ture, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726
(2010).  Each team is organized under various legal forms, all of which are re-
quired to pay federal taxes on revenues they generate. See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S.
183, 186-88 (detailing basic organizational structure of NFL); see also Dosh, supra
note 8 (discussing that teams pay taxes on revenues distributed to them by NFL). R
18. See Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing different types of tax-exempt organiza- R
tions, some of which are more commonplace than others); see also 501(c) 3 vs.
501(c) 6 Status, NAT’L BLACK CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.nationalbcc.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=936 (last visited May. 6, 2014)
(comparing requirements and purposes of 501(c)(3) organizations with require-
ments and purposes of 501(c)(6) organizations); see also 501(c)(3) and (6) Organiza-
tions: A Comparative Analysis ,  NONPROFIT LAW CENTER, http://www
.nonprofitlawcenter.com/resDetails.php?item_ref=247 (last visited May 6, 2014)
(comparing 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(6) organizations).
19. Dosh, supra note 3.
20. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Tenenbaum, chair of Nonprofit Organizations Group
at Venable LLP, discussing NFL’s tax-exempt status).
21. See id. (discussing comments from NFL league spokesman Brian McCarthy
in response to proposal from U.S. Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) to end classifica-
tion of NFL as tax-exempt organization).  Sen. Tom Coburn challenged the NFL’s
tax-exempt status by introducing an amendment to the Marketplace Fairness Act
that would “end the NFL’s exemption from taxation.” See id.  The NFL identifies
itself as a “trade association promoting interests of its 32 member clubs” on tax
forms. See Schrotenboer, supra note 6.“” R
22. See Patrick Hruby, The People vs. NFL Welfare, SPORTS ON EARTH (Oct. 1,
2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/62280950/ (discussing how it is not
widely known that NFL is nonprofit organization).  According to Lynda Woolard, a
3
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580 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 577
not make sense that an organization representing the most profita-
ble sports league in the world is tax-exempt under the federal tax
law.23  Thus, it should also come as no surprise that people are tak-
ing action to try to affect change.24
Efforts by ordinary citizens petitioning Congress to revoke the
NFL’s tax-exempt status have yet to produce any noticeable re-
sults.25  Similarly, attempts by lawmakers to bring about a vote in
Congress on this issue have flatly been ignored.26  Nevertheless, al-
though Congress will likely and ultimately decide this issue, perhaps
the public can look to the currently embattled IRS to resolve the
situation – which may also help restore some of the public’s faith in
that agency.27  Were the IRS to reevaluate the NFL’s tax-exempt
status in light of fairly recent case law and other relevant authori-
ties, it would surely determine that the NFL fails to qualify as a tax-
exempt 501(c)(6) organization.28
political organizer from Louisiana, “When people hear about it, mostly they think
it’s not right.” Id.
23. See id. (discussing how various individuals, including ordinary citizens,
critics, and even elected officials, do not think it is right for NFL to be tax-exempt).
24. For a discussion regarding actions citizens and lawmakers have taken to
address seemingly unfair and nonsensical tax-exempt status of the NFL, see infra
notes 44-64 and accompanying text. R
25. See Hruby, supra note 22 (suggesting that efforts to revoke NFL’s tax-ex- R
empt status have been “quixotic at best” thus far).
26. See Ira Boudway, A Republican Senator’s Lonely Mission to Make the NFL Pay
Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-09-19/a-republican-senator-s-lonely-mission-to-make-the-nfl-pay-taxes
(discussing how Sen. Coburn’s proposed amendment to Marketplace Fairness Act
was never brought up for vote).
27. See Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (suggesting that issue regarding NFL’s tax- R
exempt status will ultimately be “a tax policy decision for Congress”); see also Greg
Richter, Issa: IRS Scandal Broke Trust of American People, NEWSMAX.COM (Aug. 14,
2013), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/issa-irs-scandal-trust/2013/08/14/
id/520491 (citing House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) as
suggesting that “trust of American people was broken” by IRS scandal regarding
targeting certain groups applying for tax-exempt status); see also Glenn Reynolds,
IRS Scandal Means Bad News for Obama: Column, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2013), http:/
/www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/09/29/irs-tea-party-column/2892135/
(citing reports that trust in government “is lower than during Watergate,” which
poses particular challenges for IRS because it relies on voluntary compliance).  “If
everyone starts cheating, there aren’t enough IRS agents to make a dent [in en-
forcement of the tax law].” Id.
28. See Rick Cohen, Coburn Calls for End to Tax Exemption for Pro Sports Leagues,
NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/poli-
cysocial-context/22196-coburn-calls-for-end-to-tax-exemption-for-pro-sports-
leagues.html [hereinafter Coburn Calls for End] (“To many observers, the NFL’s
tax-exempt status is one big practical joke that has existed since 1966.”).  “It’s time
to alleviate legitimate nonprofits from having to explain the problem in the state-
ment, ‘you mean the NFL is nonprofit just like you.’” Id. For a more detailed
analysis of the NFL’s tax-exempt status under the relevant seven-prong test, see infra
notes 71-242 and accompanying text. R
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2014] CHALLENGING THE NFL’S TAX EXEMPT STATUS 581
This Comment analyzes the NFL’s tax-exempt status and at-
tempts to demonstrate that the League does not meet the require-
ments of a 501(c)(6) organization.29  Part II of this Comment
provides additional background on: (1) the NFL’s tax-exempt sta-
tus; (2) the challenges that have been made to try and revoke that
status; and (3) the seven factor-based analysis that courts and the
IRS use to determine if particular organizations qualify for
501(c)(6) status.30  Part III provides an in-depth explanation of
each of the seven prongs considered in the courts’ and the IRS’s
analyses, as well as an examination of how each factor relates to the
NFL’s situation.31  Finally, Part IV provides some brief concluding
commentary addressing how the NFL does not qualify for
501(c)(6) status, why the League’s tax-exempt status should be re-
voked, and the potential impact of such revocation.32
II. BACKGROUND
In 1961, Congress passed the Sports Broadcasting Act.33  This
Act allowed major professional sports to negotiate certain televi-
sion-broadcast agreements that normally would have violated fed-
eral antitrust laws.34  This special treatment, however, was not
enough for the two professional football leagues existing at that
time: the American Football League and the National Football
29. For a further discussion outlining the requirements an association must
satisfy to qualify for 501(c)(6) status, see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. R
For a detailed discussion suggesting that the NFL fails to satisfy all of the necessary
requirements to maintain its tax-exempt status, see infra notes 71-242 and accom- R
panying text.
30. For a detailed discussion on additional background information regard-
ing the NFL’s tax-exempt status, see infra notes 33-70 and accompanying text. R
31. For a detailed discussion analyzing the NFL’s tax-exempt status under the
relevant requirements, see infra notes 71-242 and accompanying text.’ R
32. For a detailed discussion concluding that the NFL does not qualify for
501(c)(6) tax-exempt status, see infra notes 243-251 and accompanying text. R
33. See Thomas Francis Moran, The Sports Broadcasting Act: Is an Update Needed?,
SETON HALL L. REPOSITORY PAPER 273, 3-9 (2013), http://scholarship.shu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1273&context=student_scholarship (discussing history
leading to passage of Sports Broadcasting Act in 1961, and legislative intent behind
Congress’s swift action to enact law); see also Gregg Easterbrook, How the NFL Fleeces
Taxpayers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/ (discussing background
to “gift-wrapped legislation,” including 1961 Sports Broadcasting Act, which gave
National Football League and American Football League special privileges under
federal laws).
34. See Easterbrook, supra note 33 (describing practical impact of 1961 Sports R
Broadcasting Act).
5
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582 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 577
League.35  Thus, in 1966, the two leagues lobbied Congress to enact
Public Law 89-800.36
Although it had no popular name, Public Law 89-800 had a
major impact on how professional sports, especially the NFL, would
be treated under various federal laws.37  First and foremost, the
1966 statute had the effect of broadening the anti-trust exemptions
from the earlier Sports Broadcasting Act.38  “Essentially [the law]
said that if the two pro-football leagues of that era merged – they
would complete such a merger four years later, forming the current
NFL – the new entity could act as a monopoly regarding television
rights.”39  As it turned out, this “was effectively a license for NFL
owners to print money,” and the special treatment afforded the
NFL did not stop there.40
The second major benefit the NFL obtained from the enact-
ment of Public Law 89-800 was much less conspicuous, but equally
remarkable.41  While the 1966 law was being negotiated in Con-
gress, NFL lobbyists successfully advocated for the inclusion of the
phrase “professional football leagues” in Section 501(c)(6) of the
IRC.42  This small change explicitly granted the NFL tax-exempt sta-
tus and has saved the League millions in tax obligations over the
35. See id. (describing how American Football League and National Football
League, which later merged to form NFL, lobbied to gain even more special treat-
ment under federal anti-trust and tax laws during 1960s).
36. See id. (discussing lobbying efforts of American Football League and Na-
tional Football League aimed at passing Public Law 89-800).
37. See id. (suggesting that Public Law 89-800 did not have popular name to
keep bill low profile, as to not draw attention to major benefits said bill provided to
NFL, especially to NFL owners).
38. See id. (discussing practical impact of Public Law 89-800).
39. Id. (outlining potential, and eventual, benefit that Public Law 89-800 af-
forded NFL as regarding negotiating television rights/agreements). See also Phil
Corso, The NFL’s Nonprofit Status Challenge, LEGALZOOM (Feb. 2014), http://www
.legalzoom.com/legal-headlines/debate-controversy/nfls-nonprofit-status-chal-
lenge (suggesting that Public Law 89-800 essentially gave NFL monopoly with re-
gard to television rights).
40. Easterbrook, supra note 33 (discussing further impacts of Public Law 89- R
800 on business operations of NFL).
41. See id. (discussing favorable tax-treatment provided to NFL resulting from
lobbying Congress).
42. See id. (discussing how NFL lobbyists changed Section 501(c)(6) by toss-
ing in “the sort of obscure provision that is the essence of the lobbyist’s art”); see
also Libin Zhang, Tax-Loophole for the Non-Profit Organization that is the National Foot-
ball League (NFL), BEST TAX LOOPHOLES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (Mar. 17,
2014), http://taxloops.blogspot.com/2013/03/tax-loophole-for-non-profit.html
(discussing modification to Section 501(c)(6) of Internal Revenue Code made by
Conference Committee after both United States House of Representatives and
Senate passed bill aimed at addressing “investment credit and accelerated
depreciation”).
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2014] CHALLENGING THE NFL’S TAX EXEMPT STATUS 583
years.43  Although the inclusion went largely unnoticed at the time,
lawmakers and members of the public have recently started to take
note, and have been organizing reform efforts.44
Some ordinary citizens have been disappointed by the recent
behavior of the NFL, including the League’s failure to effectively
acknowledge and respond to the risks of concussions faced by its
players, as well as the blacking out of games to force fans to buy
tickets instead of watching on television.45  Lynda Woolard, a politi-
cal organizer and football fan from Louisiana, decided to take ac-
tion to address the NFL’s abuse of power and public trust.46  She
took to the Internet and started a petition to ask Congress to revoke
the NFL’s tax-exempt status.47  The petition, which has more than
250,000 signatures, asks that the most profitable sports league in
the world pay its “fair share.”48
43. See Easterbrook, supra note 33 (suggesting that NFL must have saved mil- R
lions of dollars, at ordinary taxpayer’s expense since obtaining tax-exempt status).
Since the NFL was not paying taxes, “ordinary people must pay higher taxes, pub-
lic spending must decline, or the national debt must increase to make up for the
shortfall.” Id.
44. See generally Hruby, supra note 22 (detailing actions taken by private citi- R
zens and lawmakers to attempt to revoke NFL’s tax-exempt status).  For a further
discussion addressing actions taken by citizens and lawmakers to revoke the NFL’s
tax-exempt status, see infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. R
45. See Hruby, supra note 22 (discussing how Lynda Woolard, political orga- R
nizer from Louisiana, has “seen enough” of disappointing behavior by NFL and is
petitioning Congress to revoke NFL’s tax-exempt status as way of fighting back
against NFL’s abuse of power).  Recently the NFL has come under fire in the form
of numerous lawsuits for allegedly concealing “the effects of multiple head inju-
ries.” See Bianca Iozzia, Lawsuits on the Brain: Seau Suit Adds to the NFL Concussion
Litigation, MOORAD SPORTS L.J. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013), http://lawweb2009.law.villa
nova.edu/sportslaw/?p=1519 (discussing lawsuit brought by family of Junior Seau,
former NFL linebacker, in context of In Re: National Football League Players’ Concus-
sion Injury Litigation, class action suit similarly accusing NFL of fraudulently con-
cealing negative impacts of concussions).  The NFL, as defendant, and plaintiffs in
the class action suit recently settled the case for $765 million. See Bajeerah LaCava,
NFL Prepared to Settle Concussion Claims for $765 Million, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/labor-employment/b/labor-employ
ment-top-blogs/archive/2013/08/29/nfl-prepared-to-settle-concussion-claims-for-
765-million.aspx (discussing settlement of class action suit regarding NFL concus-
sion issue).
46. See Hruby, supra note 22 (detailing Woolard’s actions aimed at curtailing R
NFL’s power and correcting apparent wrong of NFL’s economic success coming at
expense of public).
47. See id. (discussing Woolard’s petition to Congress); see also Lynda Woo-
lard, Congress: Revoke the Tax-Exempt Status of the National Football League, CHANGE
.ORG, https://www.change.org/petitions/congress-revoke-the-tax-exempt-status-of-
the-national-football-league (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (presenting text of Woo-
lard’s petition and number of signatures).
48. See Woolard, supra note 47 (detailing requests made in Woolard’s R
petition).
7
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At least one lawmaker too has a similar point of view.49  U.S.
Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) strongly disagrees with the NFL’s tax-
exempt status and believes that the League is simply “taking advan-
tage of the. . . tax code.”50  To Sen. Coburn, this situation is “one of
the things in the tax code that just doesn’t make any sense.”51  The
NFL is the most profitable sports league in America.52  Yet, the NFL
is organized as a nonprofit.53  To make matters worse, the League
does not pay federal taxes due to its tax-exempt status under Sec-
tion 501(c)(6).54
In an attempt to address this apparent paradox, in 2013 Sen.
Coburn proposed an amendment to a Senate bill that would have
revoked the NFL’s tax-exempt status.55  Although the amendment
was never voted on, Sen. Coburn continues to make his case.56  He
has sent a letter to Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max
Baucus (D-MT) and ranking member Orrin Hatch (R-UT) “asking
that sports subsidies be included in any legislation to overhaul the
tax code.”57  Additionally, in September 2013, Sen. Coburn intro-
49. See Hruby, supra note 22 (explaining that Sen. Coburn also finds NFL’s R
tax-exempt status to be “hardly fair” as it requires ordinary citizens to “subsidize
special breaks for sports leagues”).
50. Dosh, supra note 8 (citing comments from Sen. Coburn’s annual “Waste R
Book” report).
51. Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (citing comments from spokesperson for Sen. R
Coburn).
52. See Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RESEARCH, LTD., http://www
.plunkettresearch.com/sports-recreation-leisure-market-research/industry-statistics
(last visited May 7, 2014) (outlining, among other things, league revenues, operat-
ing incomes, average team values for major sport leagues including NFL, MLB,
NBA, NHL, and other major sports industries).
53. See Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (discussing history of NFL’s non-profit sta- R
tus); see also Manohar, supra note 7 (indicating that NFL and other major sports R
leagues are actually non-profit organizations).
54. See Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (stating that due to classification as R
501(c)(6), NFL does not pay federal taxes); see also Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing R
that NFL is classified as 501(c)(6) organization, and not 501(c)(3) charitable
organization).
55. See Hruby, supra note 22 (detailing Sen. Coburn’s attempt to attach R
amendment to Marketplace Fairness Act which would have eliminated NFL’s ex-
empt status); see also Boudway, supra note 26 (describing Sen. Coburn’s efforts to R
“close the sport-league loophole” which currently grants NFL tax-exempt status).
56. See Boudway, supra note 26 (discussing how Sen. Coburn’s proposed R
amendment never came up for vote in Senate); see also Hruby, supra note 22 (dis- R
cussing Sen. Coburn’s efforts to eliminate NFL’s tax-exempt status generally’).
57. Hruby, supra note 22 (reporting that Sen. Coburn sent letter to leaders of R
Senate Finance Committee to ensure leadership was aware of issues surrounding
NFL’s tax-exempt status); see also Aaron Lorenzo, NFL Nonprofit Status Seen Targeted
in IRS Code Revision: Taxes, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2013-09-09/nfl-nonprofit-status-seen-targeted-in-irs-code-revision-taxes
.html (discussing Sen. Coburn’s letter to leaders of Senate Finance Committee,
8
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duced his previously proposed amendment as a stand-alone bill.58
Although the aptly named “Properly Reducing Over-Exemptions”
bill does not yet have a co-sponsor, it emphasizes that Sen. Coburn,
like many other critics and commentators, is not buying the NFL’s
tax-exempt story.59
Aside from the paradox of a profitable non-for-profit organiza-
tion, critics of the NFL’s status also disagree with the characteriza-
tion of the NFL as a trade or industry organization.60  Specifically,
people question “whether the NFL is furthering the entire football
industry.”61  There is no question that the NFL promotes the inter-
ests of its thirty-two member teams, but it does not appear to do
anything more than that.62  The NFL has a “very closed circle” of
members, and, unlike traditional trade or industry associations, one
cannot simply “start a professional football team and join the
NFL.”63  This limited membership style has led critics to argue that
the NFL is only “furthering a segment of the industry,” which
should cause the League to fail one of the requirements necessary
to maintain 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status.64
who did not respond specifically to Sen. Coburn’s letter, but rather stated that
“everything is on the table” as regarding tax reform).
58. See Hruby, supra note 22 (describing Sen. Coburn’s continued attempts to R
address matter of NFL’s tax-exempt status by introducing bills on Senate floor).
59. See id. (discussing generally petition to revoke NFL’s tax-exempt status
and Sen. Coburn’s personal efforts to have NFL’s tax-exempt status revoked); see
also Andrew B. Delaney, Taking a Sack: The NFL and Its Underserved Tax-Exempt Sta-
tus, SOC. SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1605281 (analyzing tax-exempt status of NFL and suggesting
that such status is unwarranted).  One author has been quoted as stating,
I really don’t care how they run their business. But call it a business.
Don’t feed me this line about how the NFL is a nonprofit trade associa-
tion. Don’t try to tell me that the NFL’s tax-exempt status is warranted.
Show [the average citizen] some respect and pay your taxes, NFL. The
rest of us do.
Id.
60. See Dosh, supra note 8 (citing comments that suggest NFL does not act like R
trade organization).
61. Id. (suggesting critics of NFL’s situation do not find that NFL acts like
trade or industry organization).
62. See id. (discussing that NFL does further interest of member teams, but
not necessarily entire “football” industry); see also Rick Cohen, Is the NFL’s Tax-
Exempt Status All That?, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY (June 4, 2013), http://www.non-
profitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/22395-is-the-nfl-s-tax-exempt-status-all-that
.html [hereinafter NFL’s Exempt Status] (stating that “the NFL operates for the
benefit of 32 member [teams] – no more, no less”).
63. Dosh, supra note 8 (explaining how difficult and nearly impossible it is to R
join NFL).
64. Id. (discussing comments by nonprofit organizations tax practitioner sug-
gesting that NFL does not truly qualify as 501(c)(6) as NFL does not operate as
true industry or trade association as it does not further the entire football indus-
try); see also NFL’s Exempt Status, supra note 62 (“The NFL isn’t advocating for R
9
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Courts and IRS practitioners agree that for associations to qual-
ify as tax-exempt entities under 501(c)(6), such associations must
meet the requirements of the statute itself, as well as Treasury Regu-
lation 1.501(c)(6)-1.65  To satisfy the requirements of the Regula-
tion, which “merits serious deference,” courts have held that an
entity must be an association:
(1) of persons having a common business interest; (2)
whose purpose is to promote the common business inter-
est; (3) not organized for profit; (4) that does not engage
in a regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for
profit; (5) whose activities are directed to the improve-
ment of business conditions of one or more lines of a busi-
ness as distinguished from the performance of particular
services for individual persons; and (6) of the same gen-
eral class as a chamber of commerce or a board of trade.66
Furthermore, IRS practitioners have indicated that organiza-
tions claiming 501(c)(6) status must also meet the requirements of
the relevant statute itself.67  Section 501(c)(6) of the IRC states that
organizations claiming tax exempt status may not be “organized for
profit” and “no part of the [organization’s] earnings . . .  [may in-
ure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”68
Taken altogether, these requirements create a seven-prong test for
determining whether organizations qualify for tax-exempt status
professional football as a line of business, but for the profitability of its 32 corpo-
rate-person members.”).
65. See Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2009)
(indicating that relevant Treasury Regulation warrants great deference in deter-
mining 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status of organizations); see also John Francis Reilly et
al., Exempt Organizations-Technical Instructions Program for FY 2003: IRC 501(c)(6) Or-
ganizations, at K-4 (2003), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick03.pdf (indi-
cating that in order to qualify for 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status, organizations must
meet characteristics outlined in Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-1).  To obtain
and maintain tax-exempt status, organizations must also perform particular duties
such as filing a Form 990 with the IRS, which verifies that all the various require-
ments are being met. See Jami A. Maul, Comment, America’s Favorite “Nonprofits”:
Taxation of the National Football League and Sports Organizations, 80 UMKC L. REV.
199, 201 (2011) (describing generally filing requirements for tax-exempt
organizations).
66. Bluetooth SIG Inc., 611 F.3d at 621 (outlining six-prong test); see also ABA
Ret. Funds v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60086, 10-11 (N.D.Ill. 2013)
(outlining same six-prong test that organizations must meet to receive tax-exempt
status); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1.
67. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-4 (stating that organizations claiming tax- R
exempt status under 501(c)(6) must meet all requirements of both I.R.C. § 501(c)
and Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
68. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2011).
10
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under 501(c)(6).69  When considering these requirements in an
analysis, such as the one that is to follow, it is important to under-
stand that the requirements do not stand alone, but rather are in-
terrelated, resulting in a holistic review of an association’s
qualification(s).70
III. ANALYZING THE NFL’S TAX-EXEMPT STATUS
A. Requirement 1 – “[A]ssociation . . . of persons having a
common business interest.”71
The IRS interprets the term “persons” as referring not only to
individuals, but also legal entities such as trusts and corporations.72
Furthermore, the term “business” is construed quite liberally, en-
compassing “everything about which a person can be employed.”73
Given these broad interpretations, the NFL likely satisfies the first
requirement.74
The NFL, as a professional football league, consists of thirty-
two teams, each of which is organized as a separate legal entity.75
Regardless of their legal form, however, all of the teams share in
69. For an outline of the resulting seven-prong test, see supra notes 66-68 and R
accompanying text.
70. Reilly, supra note 65, at K-5 (explaining that “analysis of any IRC R
501(c)(6) case should not be limited to one characteristic” as characteristics, or
requirements, are interrelated).
71. See Bluetooth SIG Inc., 611 F.3d at 622 (9th Cir. 2009) (outlining six-prong
test as provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
72. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-3 (defining “persons” for purposes of inter- R
preting I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)).
73. Id. (defining “business” for purposes of interpreting I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)).
74. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 197 (2010) (discussing that all
thirty-two NFL teams share common interest of promoting NFL brand of profes-
sional football).
75. See id. at 186-87 (detailing basic organizational structure of NFL); see also
McCann, supra note 17, at 730 (discussing basic organizational structure of NFL). R
The NFL is composed of member teams, which are “separately owned and oper-
ated franchises. . . that compete in games and ancillary components of those
games, such as hiring of players, coaches, and staff.” Id.
11
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the common business interest of promoting the economic success
of professional football.76  Or do they?77
One of the most important tasks in examining this first re-
quirement is to properly identify the true, common business inter-
est of the NFL and its member teams.78  The question is whether
the NFL and its member teams share the interest of promoting
“professional football” generally, or if they only share the interest of
promoting an NFL version of professional football.79  All evidence
seems to suggest that it is the latter, and that the NFL is really only
interested in promoting “NFL football.”80  While this narrower busi-
ness interest still satisfies the first requirement, it plays a significant
role in evaluating requirements four and five.81
76. See Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 197 (discussing that although in certain
situations member teams act independently for their own economic interests, all
teams share common interest of promoting NFL brand of professional football).
“The teams must compete in order to generate competitive football.”  McCann,
supra note 17, at 730.  “Less obviously, they necessarily collaborate too.” Id.  Fur- R
thermore, the fact that each of the thirty-two teams also clearly has an interest in
promoting their own economic success does not prevent the NFL from satisfying
this first requirement. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-6 (stating that “although the R
members may have a variety of interests, they must have a common interest of a
business nature that the organization promotes”); see generally Am. Needle, Inc., 560
U.S. at 188-203 (discussing how NFL teams share interest of promoting and mak-
ing league successful, while concurrently looking out for their own economic
interests).
77. For a discussion determining the common business interest of the NFL
and its member teams, see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. R
78. For a discussion regarding the importance of the NFL’s narrow interest of
promoting only “NFL football,” rather than football or professional football gener-
ally, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. R
79. See Dosh, supra note 8 (stating that “questions arise as to whether the NFL R
is furthering the entire football industry”).
80. See Coburn Calls for End, supra note 28 (suggesting that NFL does not R
promote professional football generally, but rather focuses on promoting “NFL
football”).  “It isn’t about the business of promoting professional football, but ‘pro-
moting NFL football, because it is the NFL brand and the NFL teams and logos
and products that make it a profitable business.” Id.  See also Sara Hoffman, The
NFL in Europe: International Expansion and Possibilities, MOORAD SPORTS L.J. BLOG
(Nov. 11, 2012), http://lawweb2009.law.villanova.edu/sportslaw/?p=1076 (discuss-
ing how NFL has attempted to use international expansion as way of “promoting
the NFL brand”); see also Daniel Kaplan, Can the NFL Get to $25 Billion?, SCALAR
MEDIA (Jan. 28, 2013), http://scalarmedia.com/uncategorized/can-the-nfl-get-to-
25-billion (discussing comments by Eric Grubman, Executive Vice President of
NFL Ventures and Business Operations, which suggested NFL competes as global
entertainment brand).
81. For a discussion regarding the importance of the NFL’s narrow interest of
promoting only “NFL football,” rather than football or professional football gener-
ally, see infra notes 146-175 and accompanying text. R
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss2/9
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 174 Side A      09/19/2014   14:26:10
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 174 Side A      09/19/2014   14:26:10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 13  7-JUL-14 12:07
2014] CHALLENGING THE NFL’S TAX EXEMPT STATUS 589
B. Requirement 2 – “[A]ssociation . . . whose purpose is to
promote the common business interest.”82
As suggested above, it seems clear that the “persons” who con-
stitute the NFL have a common “business” interest.83  Furthermore,
as previously stated, the NFL League Office surely promotes the
common interest of its thirty-two member teams.84  Therefore, the
NFL also likely satisfies the second requirement.85
C. Requirement 3 – “[A]ssociation . . . not organized
for profit.”86
According to the IRS, an association need not operate at a loss
in order to be considered “not organized for profit.”87  In other
words, an association does not need to have expenses exceeding
income to satisfy this requirement.88  Instead, the crucial inquiry is
whether income is distributed to the association’s members, which
would ipso facto disqualify the association from exemption under
requirement seven below (again, the interrelation between the re-
quirements cannot be overlooked).89  As will be discussed in
greater detail under requirement seven, the NFL does not meet this
requirement because there is clear evidence of distribution of in-
come among the League’s members.90
Even when examining the third requirement from a less tech-
nical perspective, commentators point out that the League likely
82. Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2009)
(outlining six-prong test as provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
83. For a discussion determining if the teams that make up the NFL share a
common business interest, see supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. R
84. For a further discussion regarding how the NFL promotes the common
business interest of its member teams, see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying R
text; see also Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing that NFL League Office furthers inter- R
ests of member teams).
85. For a discussion regarding how the NFL promotes the common business
interest of its member teams, see supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. R
86. Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2009)
(outlining six-prong test as provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
87. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-15 (clarifying that “not organized for profit” R
does not mean organizations cannot have positive earnings; rather, organizations
cannot issue stocks that carry rights to any distribution of income).
88. See id. (describing IRS position regarding what it means for organizations
to be “not organized for profit”).
89. See id. (discussing that distribution of accumulated income can constitute
inurement, which would violate requirement seven under seven-prong test for tax-
exempt status under 501(c)(6)).
90. For a further discussion regarding how distribution of income, which con-
stitutes inurement, disqualifies an association from 501(c)(6) status, see infra notes
236-242 and accompanying text. R
13
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fails to satisfy this necessary condition.91  Critics have suggested that
the NFL’s organizational structure is especially troubling.92  Not
only is Roger Goodell the Commissioner of the League, but he also
leads various other nonprofit and for-profit organizations affiliated
with the NFL.93  These for-profit entities controlled by Mr. Goodell
and the NFL have been the primary subjects of criticism.94  Specifi-
cally, critics highlight the risk of the NFL commingling its tax-ex-
empt income (from membership dues and assessments) with
revenues from affiliated for-profit ventures.95  That is, given the
complex structure of the NFL’s multifarious business entities, moni-
toring the flow of money to ensure compliance with 501(c)(6) re-
quirements is prohibitively difficult.96
Other commentators need only look at the NFL’s expenses
and revenues to conclude that the NFL is in fact “organized for
profit.”97  While it is true that the NFL’s expenses have exceeded
revenues for the past few years, this is a weak defense of the
League’s nonprofit, tax-exempt status.98  The NFL’s large expendi-
tures are due in substantial part to the exorbitant salaries it pays
91. See generally Maul, supra note 65, at 218 (suggesting that organizational R
structure of NFL, which includes close relationships between various for-profits
and nonprofits, warrants closer scrutiny of NFL’s current tax-exempt status).
92. See id. (providing issues of NFL’s organizational structure); see also Dela-
ney, supra note 59 (discussing how NFL operates through associated for-profit enti- R
ties, which distribute revenues to NFL teams and use portion of revenues to pay
NFL membership dues and assessments).
93. See Maul, supra note 65, at 218 (describing Commissioner Goodell’s vari- R
ous responsibilities as related to NFL-affiliated organizations).  The nonprofit or-
ganizations affiliated with the NFL include the Professional Football Players
Insurance Trust, the NFL Non-Player Insurance Trust, the NFL Youth Football
Fund, the NFL Disaster Relief Fund, the NFL Management Council, the NFL
Alumni Dire Need Charitable Fund, and NFL Charities. See id.  The for-profit enti-
ties under the NFL umbrella include NFL Enterprises LLC, NFL Ventures LP, NFL
Ventures, Inc., NFL Productions LLC, NFL Properties LLC, and NFL International
LLC. See id.
94. See id. (suggesting that critics have called into question relationship be-
tween non-profit tax-exempt NFL and for-profit affiliated organizations).
95. See id. at 218-19 (discussing apparent trouble of mixing income from for-
profit ventures with tax-exempt income from membership dues and assessments);
see also Delaney, supra note 59 (suggesting that NFL affiliated for-profit companies, R
such as NFL Properties, LLC and NFL Enterprises, LLC, help to finance NFL in
scheme that “some people might call [ ] something ugly like ‘money
laundering’”).
96. See NFL’s Exempt Status, supra note 62 (discussing NFL’s cash flow com- R
plying with 501(c)(6)).
97. For a discussion of the “not organized for profit” requirement as it relates
to the NFL’s expenses and revenues, see infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. R
98. See NFL’s Exempt Status, supra note 62 (suggesting that argument defend- R
ing NFL’s tax-exempt status based on expenses exceeding revenues “rings a little
hollow”).
14
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out, and the League would almost instantaneously be profitable if it
scaled back some of those salaries.99  For example, it is debatable
whether Mr. Goodell’s services as Commissioner are really worth
the $29.4 million he received in 2012, which is more than the sala-
ries of chief executives at famous for-profit organizations such as
Coca-Cola and Wal-Mart.100  Mr. Goodell’s massive salary exempli-
fies how the League’s operations, and in turn its goals, are at odds
with its nonprofit status.101
D. Requirement 4 – “[A]ssociation . . . that does not engage in
a business ordinarily conducted for profit.”102
Under the fourth requirement, the term “business” has “essen-
tially the same meaning as ‘trade or business’ under IRC 513.”103
That is, when courts evaluate whether an activity constitutes a
“trade or business,” they adopt a “profit motive” standard.104  This
does not mean, however, that an association will satisfy the fourth
requirement simply by operating a business for no profit.105  Al-
though profitability is a consideration, ultimately “it is the nature of
the activity that determines whether it is a business ordinarily car-
ried on for profit.”106
For example, certain “courts have repeatedly found organiza-
tions to be involved in a trade or business even when [such] organi-
99. See id. (suggesting that reducing salaries would cause NFL’s revenues to
exceed expenses).  For reference purposes, according to the NFL’s latest Form
990, Roger Goodell (Commissioner), Jeff Pash (EVP & Gen. Counsel), Steve Born-
stein (EVP of Media), and Paul Tagliabue (Former Commissioner) had total com-
pensation in 2011 from the NFL and related organizations in the amounts of over
$29 million, over $8 million, over $5 million, and over $8.5 million, respectively.
See NFL Form 990 at 7 (2012), available at http://990s.foundationcenter.org/
990_pdf_archive/131/131922622/131922622_201203_990O.pdf (last visited May
7, 2014) (outlining compensation details for officers, directors, trustees, key em-
ployees and highest compensated employees of NFL).
100. See Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (discussing Roger Goodell’s large salary R
and comparing it to salaries of other executives at large for-profit organizations).
101. See Manohar, supra note 7 (suggesting that Goodell’s salary is excessive R
and at odds with NFL’s nonprofit status); see also Kaplan, supra note 80 (discussing R
NFL’s aggressive plans to grow revenue to $25 billion by 2017).
102. Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2009)
(outlining six-prong test as provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
103. Reilly, supra note 65, at K-34 (citing G.C.M. 37100 (Apr. 21, 1977) and R
G.C.M. 39723 (Apr. 8, 1988)).
104. See id. (citing United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105
(1986)).
105. See id. (discussing Revenue Rulings establishing that profitability alone
does not determine if fifth requirement is satisfied).
106. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 81-174, 1981-1 C.B. 335 and Rev. Rul. 81-175, 1981-1
C.B. 337).
15
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zations provided few services themselves and made available
[services and benefits] through the activities of third-party compa-
nies.”107  Other courts have found that associations are engaged in
business ordinarily carried on for profit if such associations “com-
pete[ ] with for-profit entities in the same marketplace,” or, “if for-
profit businesses could and would perform similar functions if the
[association] ceased its operations.”108  Further, at the most basic
level, an association that “develop[s] and sell[s] a ‘product’ . . .
[and] defends its property interest by threat of litigation for trade-
mark infringement” is engaging in business ordinarily conducted
for profit.109  Given the nature of these guiding standards, deter-
mining whether an association is engaged in a business of a kind
ordinarily conducted for profit is a question of fact.110
One final consideration that further complicates the factual
analysis under this fourth requirement, as well as requirements five
and seven, is the “incidental” exception.111  Courts interpreting
these requirements have held that an exempt association “will not
forfeit tax exempt status by engaging in incidental activities which,
standing alone, would be subject to taxation.”112  The “incidental”
exception thus allows associations to engage in some business activi-
ties ordinarily conducted for profit as long as such activities are
“merely incidental to the [association’s] main [tax-exempt]
purpose.”113
107. ABA Ret. Funds v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60086, 34-35
(N.D.Ill. 2013) (discussing various court rulings holding that tax-exempt organiza-
tions who contract with third-party companies to provide benefits or services may
nonetheless be considered to be engaged in such trade or business).
108. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 34:78 (Westlaw Thomas
Reuters) (2013) (citing N.C. Ass’n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. United States, 739 F.2d
949, 955 (4th Cir. 1984)).
109. Bluetooth Association Fails to Qualify as 501(c)(6) Trade Association, NON-
PROFIT ISSUES (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.nonprofitissues.com/public/features/
leadfree/2008feb1-IS.html#.UmMi9ShNNjR (discussing Ninth Circuit’s holding
and reasoning regarding fourth prong in decision of Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United
States, 611 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2009)).
110. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-32 (discussing general rule for business R
activities).
111. See Am. Plywood Ass’n. v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830, 833 (D.Wash.
1967) (discussing “incidental” exception to three requirements under 501(c)(6)).
112. Id. at 832 (explaining that associations’ engagement in taxable activities
which are merely incidental to associations’ tax-exempt purposes will not cause
automatic forfeiture of such tax-exempt status).
113. Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 34:78 (Westlaw Thomas
Reuters) (2013) (describing incidental exception to rule that tax-exempt associa-
tions ordinarily may not engage in business ordinarily carried on for profit); see
also N.C. Ass’n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. United States, 739 F.2d 949, 955 (4th Cir.
1984) (explaining that associations whose tax-exempt status was challenged may be
16
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This begs the question of what determines whether an activity
is “primary” or “incidental.”114  For example, according to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, a determina-
tion of what constitutes a “primary” activity hinges on “the particu-
lar circumstances [of a specific case] and the reasonable
conclusions to be drawn therefrom.”115  The reviewing court must
consider “the totality of the facts and circumstances including the
business activity’s financial impact, its proportional requirements of
staff time, and the directness of its functional relationship to a tax-
exempt purpose.”116
It is difficult to apply the facts and circumstances tests de-
scribed above to the NFL’s situation because the tests require close
examination of the League’s various income streams and financials;
information that is not readily available to the public.117  Neverthe-
less, even without analyzing the NFL’s financial records, commenta-
tors have strongly suspected that the NFL operates like a “for-profit
business juggernaut[ ] . . . behind [a] nonprofit cloak.”118  One
need only look to some of the NFL’s own statements and actions to
determine that the League is operated like a business ordinarily
conducted for profit.119
Consider, for example, the League’s aggressive goal of reach-
ing revenues of $25 billion by the year 2027.120  As Eric Grubman,
Executive Vice President of NFL Ventures and Business Operations,
explained, the NFL “intended the [revenue] figure to convey what
allowed to maintain status if business activities ordinarily conducted for profit were
“incidental” to association’s tax-exempt purposes).
114. See Am. Plywood Ass’n., 267 F. Supp. at 833 (discussing that determining
whether activities are “primary” or “incidental” depends on specific facts and cir-
cumstances of each case).
115. Id. (suggesting what constitutes “primary” activity as compared to “inci-
dental’ activity).
116. N.C. Ass’n of Ins. Agents, Inc., 739 F.2d at 956 (describing test to be used
in determining whether certain activities constitute association’s “primary” and “in-
cidental” activities).
117. See The Business of Professional Football, LIBRARY OF CONG. BUSINESS REFER-
ENCE SERVICES, http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/issue3/football.html (last
updated July 9, 2013) (suggesting that financials regarding NFL are hard to come
by).
118. Rick Cohen, Playing by the NFL’s Tax Exempt Rules, NONPROFIT QUARTERLY
(Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=3056:playing-by-the-nfls-tax-exempt-rules&catid=149:rick
-cohen&Itemid=991 (discussing blurred lines between nonprofits, like NFL, acting
as for-profit organizations and vice versa).
119. See Manohar, supra note 7 (discussing how NFL appears to be operated R
like for-profit corporation that is designed and run to make money).
120. See Kaplan, supra note 80 (discussing NFL’s aggressive plans to grow reve- R
nue to $25 billion by 2027).
17
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scale the NFL needed in order to compete as a global entertain-
ment brand.”121  Mr. Grubman’s comments further suggested that
the League not only competes against other sports leagues, but also
“consumer product companies such as Procter & Gamble, Walt Dis-
ney and Apple.”122  These comments reveal the true business na-
ture of the NFL, which aims to compete with various for-profit
organizations in different industries; goals that should cause the
League to lose its tax-exempt status.123  Under this basic analysis “it
seems inconceivable that the NFL is not engaging in a regular busi-
ness of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit.”124
The NFL would likely respond to the above criticisms by claim-
ing that the League’s for-profit business activities are only “inciden-
tal” to its “primary” tax-exempt activities.125  Currently, each of the
thirty-two NFL teams pay the League Office around six million dol-
lars each year in membership dues and assessments.126  These pay-
ments provide the NFL roughly two hundred million dollars
annually, a number that may actually be increasing.127  These funds
are used to cover “non-revenue overhead activities such as office
rent, League Office salaries and game officiating.”128  While two
121. Id. (discussing comments by Eric Grubman which suggested NFL was
competing as “global entertainment brand”); see generally Hoffman, supra note 80 R
(discussing NFL’s repeated and continued attempts at global expansion, most re-
cently by “focus[ing] the league’s international business strategy to presenting the
NFL to the widest possible global audience, including broader media visibility and
the staging of international regular-season games”).
122. Kaplan, supra note 80 (discussing comments regarding NFL’s alleged R
competitors); see also Mike Vorkunov, NFL is First Sports League to Start Venture Capi-
tal Arm, Looking For New Revenue Streams, NJ.COM (May 25, 2013), http://www.nj
.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/05/nfl_teams_with_equity_firm_to.html (discussing
how NFL is more than “just a football-only conglomeration . . . [it] must do more
than just sell its sport[ ]” to achieve aggressive revenue goals).
123. For a discussion of how courts determine if associations engage in busi-
ness ordinarily conducted for profit, and how such determinations impact associa-
tions’ tax-exempt status, see supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. R
124. Brian Frederick, Why Does the National Football League Deserve Tax-Exempt
Status?, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-
does-the-national-football-league-deserve-tax-exempt-status-2012-3 (arguing that
NFL should not enjoy tax-exempt status); see also Manohar, supra note 7 (discussing R
how NFL appears to be operated like for-profit corporation that is designed and
run to make money).
125. For a discussion regarding “incidental” activities exception to the fourth
requirement, see supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text. R
126. See Frederick, supra note 124 (stating that teams pay NFL about six mil- R
lion dollars per year); see also Dosh, supra note 8 (stating that teams pay NFL six R
million dollars each year in dues and assessments).
127. See Frederick, supra note 124 (discussing membership dues and assess- R
ments paid to the League Office).
128. Dosh, supra note 8 (citing comments from NFL spokesman Brian McCar- R
thy regarding funding NFL receives from member teams for “overhead activities”).
18
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hundred million dollars is certainly a great deal of money, it does
not compare to the $1.8 billion that was generated by NFL Ventures
in 2010 (an amount that also likely increased in subsequent
years).129
Technically, NFL Ventures is owned by the thirty-two NFL
teams and is an entity separate from the NFL.130  However, it is diffi-
cult to find that NFL Ventures and the NFL League Office do not
constitute one economic unit.131  The thirty-two teams that own
NFL Ventures are also the only members of the NFL and, conse-
quently, the only entities with the power to elect the Commissioner
of the NFL, who runs the NFL League Office.132  Furthermore, the
stated goal of NFL Ventures is to “advertise, promote and market
the [NFL] and its Member Clubs.”133  Additionally, Eric Grubman,
the current President of NFL Ventures, is listed on the NFL’s Form
990 as the NFL’s Executive Vice President of Business Ventures.134
Given these close relationships and the common control group,
NFL Ventures and the NFL League Office could and should be
considered one economic unit.135  Therefore, NFL Ventures’ reve-
nues and service activities are clearly more than “incidental” as
For a further discussion addressing the NFL’s “administrative” function of negoti-
ating stadium deals, and how the NFL’s stadium funding scheme appears to run
afoul of the inurement prohibition, see infra notes 229-235 and accompanying R
text.
129. See Tommy Craggs, Exclusive: Leaked Documents Show Operating Profits For
NFL Ventures Rose 29 Percent Last Year, DEADSPIN (July 15, 2011), http://deadspin
.com/5821386/audited-financials-operating-profit-for-nfl-ventures-lp-rose-from-
999-million-to-13-billion-last-year (discussing financials of NFL Ventures).
130. See Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing ownership of for-profit NFL Ventures R
organization).
131. For further discussion about how NFL Ventures and the NFL League
Office act as one economic unit, see infra notes 132-136 and accompanying text. R
132. See Mark Maske, Owners Pick Goodell as NFL Commissioner, WASHINGTON
POST (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/08/08/AR2006080801043.html (stating that owners of thirty-two NFL mem-
ber teams voted to elect Goddell as NFL commissioner).
133. NFL Ventures, L.P. and Subsidiaries Independent Auditors’ Report at 6, availa-
ble at http://edge-cache.gawker.com/deadspin/nflventures.pdf [hereinafter Audi-
tors’ Report] (describing organizational structure and background of NFL
Ventures, L.P.).
134. See NFL Form 990 at 7 (2012), available at http://990s.foundationcenter
.org/990_pdf_archive/131/131922622/131922622_201203_990O.pdf (last visited
May 7, 2014) (outlining details regarding titles, average work hours, compensa-
tion, etc. for officers, directors, trustees, key employees and highest compensated
employees of NFL); see also NFL signs deal with Ticketmaster, TAMPA BAY BUS. J. (Dec.
19, 2007), http://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stories/2007/12/17/daily26
.html (identifying Eric Grubman as President of NFL Ventures).
135. For further discussion about how NFL Ventures and the NFL League
Office act as one economic unit and should be considered one such economic
unit, see supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. R
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compared to the “non-revenue overhead activities” that supposedly
constitute the NFL’s “primary” business activities.136
Finally, a bit of careless drafting by NFL Ventures may also
shed some light on the League’s true business intentions.137  Ac-
cording to consolidated financials for NFL Ventures publicized in
2011, the operations of NFL International LLC, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of NFL Ventures, “consist primarily of marketing, pub-
licizing, promoting, licensing, distributing and developing the
NFL’s international business.”138  These are curious operational
objectives, considering that all NFL member teams are located
within the United States.139  Not to mention, it seems odd that an
alleged U.S. trade association would have any sort of “international
business,” considering that such an association may not even en-
gage in any domestic business for profit.140
E. Requirement 5 – “[A]ssociation . . . whose activities are
directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or
more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of
particular services for individual persons.”141
There are two major components to the fifth requirement,
namely a “line of business” component and a “performance of par-
ticular services” component, each of which will be addressed in
turn.142
136. For a discussion regarding the relationship between “incidental” and
“primary” activities for determining whether a business activity is of a kind ordina-
rily engaged in for profit which would disqualify an association from 501(c)(6) tax-
exempt status, see supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text. R
137. See Auditors’ Report, supra note 133 (detailing operations of NFL Ven- R
ture’s subsidiaries).
138. Id. (describing operations of NFL International LLC).
139. See National Football League – NFL Map, SPORT MAP WORLD, available at
http://www.sportmapworld.com/map/american-football/usa/nfl/ (last visited
Oct. 7, 2013) (indicating location of all thirty-two NFL member teams on map of
United States).
140. For a discussion regarding the prohibitions for 501(c)(6) trade associa-
tions or business leagues from engaging in business of kind regularly engaged in
for profit, see supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. R
141. Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2009)
(outlining six-prong test as provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
142. For a discussion regarding the line of business component, see infra
notes 143-180 and accompanying text.  For a discussion regarding the perform- R
ance of particular services component, see infra notes 181-200 and accompanying R
text.
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1. Line of Business Analysis
The first component that must be considered under this analy-
sis is the “line of business” test, which requires an understanding of
what constitutes a “line of business.”143  Courts have defined a “line
of business” as “an entire industry or all components of an industry
within a geographic region.”144  The IRS offers a more detailed def-
inition stating that a “line of business” is a “trade or occupation,
entry into which is not restricted by a patent, trademark, or other
means that allow private parties to restrict the right to engage in the
business.”145
To determine whether the League satisfies the line of business
requirement, the particular industry to which the NFL and its mem-
ber teams belong must first be established.146  Is the NFL part of a
professional football industry that would include other professional
football leagues such as Arena Football?147  Or, does the NFL con-
stitute its own industry, namely the industry of professional “NFL
143. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 482-83
(1978) (discussing history of interpretation of meaning of “line of business”); see
also Nat’l Prime Users Grp., Inc. v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Md.
1987) (interpreting “line of business” as meaning “an entire industry or all compo-
nents of an industry within a geographic area”). But see Pepsi-Cola Bottlers’ Ass’n.
v. United States, 369 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1966) (holding that association shall
not be denied tax-exempt status “merely because its members all bottle a particular
soft drink product”), abrogated by Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, 440 U.S. at 472.
144. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, 440 U.S. at 482-83; see also Nat’l Prime Users Grp.,
Inc., 667 F. Supp. at 256 (defining “line of business”).
145. Reilly, supra note 65, at K-21 (defining “line of business”). R
146. For a discussion regarding the importance of determining what industry
an association belongs to for purposes of determining if such association satisfies
the “line of business” requirement, see supra notes 143-145 and accompanying R
text.
147. See National Football League, Arena Football League Games Will Air on NFL
Network in 2010, NFL.COM (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/
09000d5d81658e83/article/arena-football-league-games-will-air-on-nfl-network-in-
2010 (“‘We embrace football at all levels,’ [stated] Charles Copin, Vice President
of Programming of NFL Network.”). But see Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing com- R
ments from nonprofit organizations practitioner who questions NFL’s 501(c)(6)
status, particularly whether NFL “is furthering the entire football industry”).  The
NFL seems to function more like an “exclusive club” rather than an industry associ-
ation. See id.  That is, one “can’t start a professional football team and join the
NFL,” which operates in a “very closed circle.” Id.; see also NFL’s Exempt Status,
supra note 62 (“The members of the American Professional Football League or the R
Professional Indoor Football League – other professional football leagues – aren’t
about to be admitted as members to the NFL, because the NFL is a closed-mem-
bership group.”).
21
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football?”148  Or, is the NFL part of a larger entertainment or pro-
fessional sports industry?149
Although no court has issued any determinative ruling as to
whether the NFL is part of a larger entertainment industry, or if the
League constitutes its own industry, the NFL would likely cite dicta
from a Supreme Court case that supports the latter view.150  In its
“line of business” analysis in National Muffler Dealers Association v.
United States, the Supreme Court briefly compared the National
Muffler Dealers Association (NMDA) to the NFL.151  The Supreme
Court stated that the NFL was different from the NMDA as the NFL
was “an ‘industrywide’ professional football league.”152  According
to the Court, the fact that the League was an “industrywide” associa-
tion supported its tax-exempt status, unlike the NMDA, which was a
simply a collection of franchisees selling a particular brand of car
mufflers.153
This “industrywide” view of the NFL, however, is outdated and
misplaced.154  Suggesting that the NFL constitutes “an ‘industry-
wide’ professional football league” ignores the fact that other pro-
fessional football leagues exist.155  For example, since the Supreme
Court’s 1979 National Muffler Dealers Association decision, the Arena
148. See Coburn Calls for End, supra note 28 (suggesting that NFL does not R
promote professional football generally, but rather focuses on promoting “NFL
football”).  For a further discussion addressing whether the NFL constitutes its own
industry, see infra notes 161-175 and accompanying text. R
149. Research on the entertainment and professional sports industries, as well
as commentary by NFL executives, would suggest that the NFL is actually part of
one or both of the aforementioned industries. See Sports Industry Overview, supra
note 52 (indicating that NFL is classified as member of “Sports Industry”); see also R
The Sports Market, ATKEARNEY (March 2011), http://www.atkearney.com/paper/-/
asset_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/the-sports-market/10192 (suggesting
that “U.S. Football” is part of global sports industry); see also Kaplan, supra note 80 R
(discussing comments by Eric Grubman, Executive Vice President of NFL Ventures
and Business Operations, which suggest NFL competes as “global entertainment
brand”).
150. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1978) (suggesting that following 1966 merger, NFL became “industrywide” pro-
fessional football league which may be afforded tax-exempt status).
151. See id. (comparing association of franchisees with NFL).
152. Id. (contrasting NFL with NMDA).
153. See id. (explaining Court’s view that NFL, unlike NMDA, was “industry-
wide” association).
154. For a discussion regarding how the NFL should not constitute an “indus-
trywide” association, see infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text. R
155. See Howie Long, Professional American Football Leagues Besides the NFL, DUM-
MIES.COM, http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/professional-american-foot-
ball-leagues-besides-the.html (last visited May 7, 2014) (identifying Arena Football,
Canadian Football League and United Football League as other forms of profes-
sional American football); see also Chris Johnson, The Growth of American Football:
How Successful Can the Sport be Overseas?, BLEACHER REPORT (July 15, 2009), http://
22
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Football League has been created and established itself as a legiti-
mate form of professional football in the United States.156  Not to
mention, the Canadian Football League has fared reasonably well
in Canada since its founding in 1958.157  If the NFL were truly an
industry association, it would not hesitate to accept other profes-
sional football teams from the Arena Football League, Canadian
Football League, or other leagues into its ranks.158  But the NFL has
not incorporated other professional football teams from other
leagues, nor is there evidence to suggest that the NFL is consider-
ing doing so in the future.159
Perhaps then the NFL does constitute its own industry, rather
than a broader, inclusive professional football industry.160  Even if
one subscribes to this view, however, and believes that the NFL rep-
resents its own “NFL football” industry, the League still faces an up-
hill battle to satisfy the “line of business” requirement.161  From an
economic standpoint, with annual revenues of almost nine billion
dollars (and growing), the NFL surely could constitute a freestand-
ing industry, as the average person understands that term.162  The
problem for the League, however, lies not in its financials, but
bleacherreport.com/articles/218330-growth-of-american-football  (listing interna-
tional professional American football leagues).
156. See Key Dates, ARENAFOOTBALL.COM, http://www.arenafootball.com/his-
tory/key-dates.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (outlining history of Arena Foot-
ball, which was first conceptualized in 1981 and whose first regular season debuted
in 1987).
157. See Canadian Football League History, http://www.mmbolding.com/BSR/
CFL_NFL_CFL_History.htm (last visited May 7, 2014) (providing background and
historical information on Canadian Football league generally).
158. See The Rules: AFL v. NFL, MEN’S FITNESS, http://www.mensfitness.com/
life/sports/the-rules-afl-vs-nfl (discussing “”the basic differences between NFL and
AFL).  The article presents a chart comparing each game’s rules, including length
of field, width of goal posts, but emphasizing that both leagues are examples of
professional football. See id.
159. See NFL’s Exempt Status, supra note 62 (discussing how NFL operates R
like “closed-membership group” that does not allow other members to join, which
is not how industries and industry associations typically operate).
160. For a discussion addressing how the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l
Muffler Dealers Ass’n suggested that the NFL was an “industrywide” association, see
supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. R
161. For a discussion regarding NFL’s apparent struggles to establish itself as
a freestanding industry constituting its own line of business, see infra notes 162-175 R
and accompanying text.
162. See Sports Industry Overview, supra note 52 (providing revenue amount for R
NFL during 2011-12 season).
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rather with how the courts have interpreted what it means to consti-
tute an industry.163
Courts find that an industry does not exist where an associa-
tion, such as the NFL, has created and controls a particular product
line or type of commerce.164  The NFL is similarly situated with
Bluetooth SIG Inc. (“SIG”), which applied for and was denied
501(c)(6) tax-exempt status in 2009.165  SIG was an association that
owned and marketed both a technology and a trademark (i.e.,
“Bluetooth”).166  In reaching its decision to deny SIG 501(c)(6) tax-
exempt status, the Ninth Circuit clearly outlined why Bluetooth-en-
abled products did not constitute their own industry, a discussion
relevant to the present analysis of the NFL.167
First, the court noted that SIG “create[d] a common interest
between its members” as opposed to “serving as a vehicle for ad-
vancing a common and pre-existing interest between members.”168
Next, the Ninth Circuit cited that SIG could not identify any other
line of business (or industry) in which one needed to join the in-
dustry association in order to meaningfully participate in that in-
dustry.169  “Nor has SIG pointed to any industry where the industry
organization created the industry itself. The ‘Bluetooth industry’ is
inextricable from [Bluetooth SIG Inc.] itself, which controls the
rights to the technology and trademark.”170
163. For a discussion addressing how courts would likely analyze the NFL’s
situation regarding whether the League constitutes its own industry or not, see
infra notes 164-171 and accompanying text. R
164. For a discussion regarding courts’ hesitation to recognize an industry
created and controlled by one association, see infra notes 168-170 and accompany- R
ing text.
165. See generally Bluetooth SIG Inc., v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622-28
(9th Cir. 2009) (explaining how Bluetooth SIG Inc. (SIG) was applying for tax-
exempt status, but was denied such status on grounds that it failed requirements
one, four and five of Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-1). For a further discus-
sion comparing the situations of SIG and the NFL, see infra notes 171-174. R
166. See Bluetooth SIG Inc., 611 F.3d at 618 (describing Bluetooth technology
that “provides a language for electronic devices to talk to one another”).
167. See id. at 625 (explaining why “Bluetooth-enabled products” do not con-
stitute industry).  For a further discussion addressing how the Ninth Circuit’s rul-
ing may relate to the NFL’s circumstances, see infra notes 171-174 and R
accompanying text.
168. Bluetooth SIG Inc., 611 F.3d. at 623 (discussing technical distinction be-
tween association that creates common interest among members and association
that brings together members who already have common interest).
169. See id. at 625 (discussing that SIG was unable to identify any other indus-
try that required membership in specific industry association as prerequisite to
participating in such industry).
170. Id.
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It is difficult to see how the NFL could distinguish itself from
SIG sufficiently to survive the type of analysis applied by the Ninth
Circuit.171  Just like SIG, the NFL created the industry and common
interest among its member teams with the merger of the American
Football League and National Football League in 1970.172  Next,
one cannot participate in the “NFL football” industry without join-
ing the NFL, which is nearly impossible due to the League’s exclu-
sivity.173  Finally, the “NFL football” industry is “inextricable” from
the NFL, which goes to great lengths to protect all of its private
interests.174
Some league executives even suggest that the NFL should not
constitute its own industry, but rather, should be considered part of
the larger entertainment or entertainment sports industry.175  If the
NFL wishes to compete in the global entertainment market with
for-profit entities, it should be allowed to do so unimpeded.176
However, if the NFL is going to compete in the global entertain-
ment industry, it cannot simultaneously claim to be a tax-exempt
industry association.177
In the end, the NFL does not serve the entire entertainment
industry, or all portions thereof within a geographic location.178  In
fact, the NFL does not even serve all of “professional football”
171. For a discussion regarding obstacles the NFL may face in distinguishing
its situation from that of Bluetooth SIG Inc. as decided by the Ninth Circuit, see
infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text. R
172. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1979) (discussing generally how NFL came into existence following 1966 merger,
creating “industrywide” professional football league); see also Maul, supra note 65, R
at 216 (discussing generally 1966 merger of American Football League and Na-
tional Football League).
173. See Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing how membership in NFL is limited R
and one “can’t start a professional football team and join the NFL”).
174. See generally Auric D. Steele, The NFL Flexes its Copyright Muscle, THE BRAND
.COM, http://brandlaw.org/2010/01/nfl-flexes-its-copyright-muscle/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2013) (discussing generally various ways in which NFL protects images,
pictures, statistics, and other information or data which is somehow related to NFL
games, teams, etc.).
175. See Kaplan, supra note 80 (discussing comments by Eric Grubman, Exec- R
utive Vice President of NFL Ventures and Business Operations, which suggest NFL
competes as global entertainment brand).
176. See id. (discussing NFL and member teams’ aggressive goals of increasing
revenues by competing with various global organizations in various industries).
177. For a discussion addressing impact of industry association competing
with for-profit organizations in the marketplace, that is, engaging in business ordi-
narily conducted for profit, see supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. R
178. For a further discussion regarding the requirement that industry associa-
tions serve an entire industry, or all portions of an industry within a geographic
region, see supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text. R
25
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within the United States.179  The League does not seek to improve
the business conditions of any line of business – it serves only its
thirty-two member teams, and does nothing more.180
2. Performance of Particular Services Analysis
The second component under the fifth requirement is essen-
tially the converse of the first factor, requiring that an association
not have as its primary activity the “performance of particular ser-
vices for individual persons.”181  That is, when an association directs
its primary activities to the improvement of business conditions for
one or more lines of business (i.e. for more than just thirty-two foot-
ball teams), such an association would not be primarily performing
services for individual members or persons.182  This is not to say,
however, that a 501(c)(6) association may never incidentally per-
form particular services for its members.183
This limitation is best illustrated by two cases that have come
before the IRS.184  In one case, the tax-exempt status of an associa-
179. For a discussion addressing how the NFL does not constitute an industry
association serving to promote professional football generally, see supra notes 154- R
160. R
180. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 197-98 (2010) (discussing how
NFL teams share economic interest of “promoting NFL football” and “the NFL
brand”); see also Maul, supra note 65, at 218-19 (suggesting that NFL operates for R
benefit of its members); Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing how critics question if NFL R
furthers “the entire football industry”); NFL’s Exempt Status, supra note 62 (sug- R
gesting that “the NFL isn’t advocating for professional football as a line of busi-
ness, but for the profitability of its [thirty-two]corporate-person members”).
181. Reilly, supra note 65, at K-20 (discussing converse relationship between R
primarily improving business conditions of line of business and performing partic-
ular services).  Organizations claiming 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status must primarily
improve business conditions of one or more lines of business, which inherently
would prevent such organizations from primarily performing particular services.
See id.
182. See id. (explaining converse relationship between “improvement of busi-
ness conditions of one or more lines of business” and “performance or particular
services for individual persons”).
183. See id. at K-24 (acknowledging that when associations perform valid pro-
motional activities, such as general advertising campaigns, members will inciden-
tally benefit from such activities as though associations had performed particular
services, but such incidental benefits will not cause associations to jeopardize their
tax-exempt status).  Much like incidentally engaging in business of a kind ordina-
rily conducted for business will not cause an association to run afoul of require-
ment four, as discussed above, so too may an association engage in activities that
incidentally benefit individual members.  For a further discussion addressing the
incidental exception, see supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text. R
184. For discussion explaining technical distinction between performing par-
ticular services and receiving incidental benefits from activities directed at improv-
ing business conditions of one or more lines of business, see infra notes 185-188 R
and accompanying text.
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tion of merchants in a particular shopping center was denied be-
cause the association’s advertisements contained the names of the
individual merchants.185  This type of specific advertising was deter-
mined to constitute performance of particular services.186  Alterna-
tively, the IRS found no issue with a different association that
engaged in “a general advertising campaign to encourage the use
of products and services of the industry as a whole.”187  The basic
principle is that if the benefits of an association’s advertising, or
other activities, reach only members of that association, as opposed
to members of the industry as a whole, the association would fail to
meet this fifth requirement.188
Furthermore, courts ruling on this issue have stated that in de-
ciding if an association performs particular services, the “ultimate
inquiry is whether the association’s activities advance the members’
interests generally, by virtue of their membership in the industry, or
whether they assist members in the pursuit of their individual busi-
nesses.”189  Under this framework, it has been found that when an
association benefits only those who participate in the association, as
opposed to all members of the corresponding industry, 501(c)(6)
tax-exempt status shall be denied.190  Moreover, courts also look to
the relationship between the services rendered by an association to
its members and the fees and assessments collected from those
members.191  If the fees and assessments that the association col-
185. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-24 (discussing Revenue Ruling 64-315 R
which determined that advertising carrying names of particular members of organ-
ization constituted performing particular services).
186. See id. (“Advertising that carries the names of members generally consti-
tutes the performance of particular services for members.”).
187. Id. (discussing Revenue Ruling which determined that general advertis-
ing promoting use of products/services of entire industry did not violate prohibi-
tion of performing particular services for members).
188. See id. (discussing technical distinction between performing particular
services and receiving incidental benefits from general activities directed at im-
proving business conditions of one or more lines of business); see also Rev. Rul. 67-
77, 1967-1 C.B. 138 (determining that general advertising activities of association
which limited membership to car dealers of a particular make of automobile con-
stituted performance of particular services as the activity was not improving busi-
ness condition of entire automotive industry).
189. ABA Ret. Funds v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60086, *14-15
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2013) (providing standard by which courts determine whether
association provides particular services).
190. See generally id. at *15-16 (discussing that organization’s activities were
invalidly assisting individual members as opposed to promoting industry members’
interests generally through activities such as “educational programs, lobbying activ-
ities, and institutional advertising services”).
191. See MIB, Inc. v. Comm’r, 734 F.2d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 1984) (discussing that
major factor in determining if services performed are “particular” is proportion of
fees and assessments collected compared to benefits that members received).
27
Schmed: Official Timeout on the Field: Critics Have Thrown a Red Flag and
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 181 Side B      09/19/2014   14:26:10
35091-vls_21-2 Sheet No. 181 Side B      09/19/2014   14:26:10
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-2\VLS209.txt unknown Seq: 28  7-JUL-14 12:07
604 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21: p. 577
lects from its members correspond exactly or substantially to the
value of the benefit the members receive, the courts will likely find
that particular services have been performed, and tax-exempt status
will be denied.192
When addressing this issue, the NFL would likely argue that it
is purely engaged in general “non-revenue overhead activities” and
that it does not perform any particular services for any of its mem-
ber teams.193  While this position may seem reasonable, observers
taking a more critical view of the common control group and close
relationships between the NFL and NFL Ventures, for example,
reach a very different conclusion.194  Specifically, the NFL could be
said to perform particular services for its members based on the
activities that NFL Ventures performs on behalf of, and likely at the
direction of, the NFL for the benefit of member teams.195
One need only look at NFL Ventures’ own descriptions of the
operations performed by its wholly owned subsidiaries to conclude
that those entities, which are very closely related to the NFL, gener-
ate benefits enjoyed primarily by the NFL and its member teams.196
For example, the operations of NFL Enterprises LLC, one of the
NFL Ventures’ wholly owned subsidiaries, “consist primarily of ad-
vertising, publicizing, promoting, marketing and selling broadcasts
of NFL games through ‘NFL Sunday Ticket’ and related program-
ming, including NFL Network.”197  Additionally, NFL Productions
LLC, another of NFL Ventures’ wholly owned subsidiaries, “prima-
rily produces NFL-related programming for the NFL and its Mem-
ber Clubs.”198  Although NFL Productions LLC supposedly also
192. See id. at 78-79 (discussing how MIB court knew of “no case under the
current regulation where business league status has been granted to an entity
whose modus operandi involves the performing of discrete services for individual
members – and at charges substantially tied to those very services”).
193. See Dosh, supra note 8 (describing activities NFL League Office engages R
in, including paying for game officiating).
194. For a further discussion of the close relationship between the common
control group for the NFL and NFL Ventures, which creates a strong case to con-
sider the related entities as one economic unit, see supra notes 130-136 and accom- R
panying text.
195. For a discussion regarding the particular services that NFL Ventures per-
forms which should be attributed to the NFL, due to the close relationship be-
tween the two entities, see infra notes 196-199 and accompanying text. R
196. For a discussion regarding the particular services that NFL Ventures and
its wholly-owned subsidiaries perform to benefit NFL member teams, see infra
notes 197-199 and accompanying text. R
197. Auditors’ Report, supra note 133, at 6 (describing operational activities R
of NFL Enterprises LLC).
198. See id. (describing primary operational activities of NFL Productions LLC
as marketing related activities).
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“provides services to customers operating in the entertainment and
media industries,” one can reasonably assume such services still re-
late to and benefit the NFL and its member teams, which does not
help the NFL’s case.199  Based on the close relationship between
the NFL, NFL Ventures, and NFL Ventures’ wholly owned subsidi-
aries, and the services these entities provide, it is clear that the
League’s primary activity is performing particular services for indi-
vidual persons/teams, which violates the fifth requirement.200
F. Requirement 6 – “[A]ssociation . . . of the same general class
as a chamber of commerce or a board of trade.”201
Courts have stated that in determining whether an association
is “of the same general class as a chamber of commerce or a board
of trade” the association “must possess the general characteristics of
[a chamber of commerce or a board of trade].”202  To assist in such
determinations courts have indicated that the important factors
one must consider are the purposes and operations of chambers of
commerce or boards of trade, and how these purposes and opera-
tions relate to the applying association.203  Essentially, an associa-
tion will be considered to be “of the same general class as a
chamber of commerce or a board or trade” if such association’s
purposes are: (1) “to promote [a] common interest;” (2) “similar to
those ‘of a chamber of commerce or a board of trade;’” and (3) not
“to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for
profit.”204  As prongs one and three of this analysis have already
been discussed, the focus here will be on the second prong regard-
199. See id. (describing additional activities of NFL Productions LLC in en-
tertainment and media).
200. For a discussion addressing how courts and the IRS handle determina-
tions of whether associations provide particular services to individuals and how
those criteria apply to the NFL’s situation suggests that the NFL would be found to
be performing particular services, see supra notes 181-199 and accompanying text. R
201. Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. United States, 611 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 2009)
(outlining six-prong test as provided by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1).
202. Produce Exch. Stock Clearing Ass’n v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 142, 144 (2d
Cir. 1934) (determining that organizations attempting to qualify for tax-exempt
status must “possess the general characteristics of [the] other groups with which
the statute groups [such organization]”).
203. See Retailers Credit Ass’n v. Comm’r, 90 F.2d 47, 50 (9th Cir. 1937) (dis-
cussing how to determine if association applying for tax-exempt status meets re-
quirement of being “of the same general class as a chamber of commerce or board
of trade”).
204. Id. (outlining analysis used to determine if association is like chamber of
commerce).
29
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ing purposes “similar to those ‘of a chamber of commerce or board
of trade.’”205
In order to determine whether an organization can satisfy the
second purpose prong under this sixth requirement, courts have
had to clarify what constitutes either a “chamber of commerce” or a
“board of trade” and how their respective purposes differ.206  A
chamber of commerce is “a board or association to promote the
commercial interests of a locality, a county or the like.”207  Alterna-
tively, a board of trade is considered to be “a body of men organ-
ized for the advancement and protection of business interests.”208
Although these terms have very similar definitions, their purposes
differ in an important respect.209  Specifically, chambers of com-
merce promote “all businesses in a particular geographic location,”
while boards of trade only promote and advance one or more, but
not all, lines of business in a particular geographic area.210
Applying these principles to the NFL, it is clear that the League
does not constitute a chamber of commerce.211  “The NFL exclu-
sively promotes NFL football,” and does not promote business gen-
erally.212  The more involved analysis, however, considers whether
the NFL is a board of trade.213
Only if the NFL were found to constitute its own industry could
it potentially qualify as a board of trade, one that promotes the line
of business of “NFL football.”214  However, as argued above, “NFL
football” is not, and should not constitute, an industry (or line of
205. For a discussion addressing prong one (promotion of a common inter-
est) as applied to the NFL, see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.  For a R
discussion addressing prong three (not engaging in business ordinarily carried on
for profit) as applied to the NFL, see supra notes 103-141 and accompanying text. R
206. See Retailers Credit Ass’n, 90 F.2d at 51 (examining difference between
“chamber of commerce” and “board of trade”).
207. Id. (explaining definition of “chamber of commerce” as defined by Web-
ster’s New International Dictionary).
208. Id. (explaining definition of “board of trade” as defined by Webster’s
New International Dictionary).
209. See id. (discussing difference between “board of trade” and “chamber of
commerce”).
210. Id. (discussing specific, technical distinction between “board of trade”
and “chamber of commerce”).
211. See Hruby, supra note 22 (suggesting that NFL does not operate like local R
Chamber of Commerce by promoting specific brand of product).
212. Id. (discussing that unlike Chambers of Commerce NFL does not pro-
mote business generally).
213. For a discussion addressing whether the NFL constitutes a board of
trade, see infra notes 214-217 and accompanying text. R
214. For a further discussion regarding definition of “line of business” and
whether the NFL constitutes its own industry, see supra notes 143-180 and accom- R
panying text.
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business).215  Furthermore, at its core, the League has “clear for-
profit goals” and competes with for-profit companies and corpora-
tions.216  These undertakings are inapposite to the standard pur-
poses of either chambers of commerce or boards of trade, which
leads to the conclusion that the NFL fails this sixth requirement.217
G. Requirement 7 – “[A]ssociation . . . no part of the net
earnings of which inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.”218
The inurement prohibition invoked by this requirement ap-
plies to numerous tax-exempt organizations under Section 501(c),
including 501(c)(6) entities.219  The determination of whether in-
urement has occurred or is occurring is very fact specific.220  Conse-
quently, courts and commentators have struggled to establish a
precise definition for what constitutes “inurement.”221
Black’s Law Dictionary defines inure as “to take effect” or “to
come into use.”222  That definition, however, is not as helpful as the
explanation provided by one commentator on the NFL’s tax-ex-
empt status.223  As that commentator stated, “in language [your av-
erage] Bob could understand [this requirement provides that]: a
nonprofit can’t pass its financial benefits onto others.”224
This simplified conceptualization of inurement, however, is
somewhat misleading because it fails to address the “incidental” ex-
215. For a discussion addressing that the NFL should not constitute its own
industry, see supra notes 161-180 and accompanying text. R
216. See Manohar, supra note 7 (suggesting that NFL is operated like for-profit R
corporation designed to make money); see also Kaplan, supra note 80 (discussing R
NFL’s aggressive goals for increasing revenue and competing with multi-national
corporations).
217. For a further discussion regarding the operations and purposes of cham-
bers of commerce and boards of trade, see supra notes 206-210 and accompanying R
text.
218. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2011).
219. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-16 (detailing all classifications of tax-ex- R
empt organizations that are subject to inurement prohibition).
220. See id. (indicating that determinations of inurement are case and fact-
specific).
221. See id. (stating that courts have not established one, precise definition of
“inurement”); see also Delaney, supra note 59 (discussing possible definitions of R
“inurement”).
222. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 842 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “inure”).
223. See generally Delaney, supra note 59 (examining NFL’s tax-exempt status R
through sarcastic, yet academic lens).
224. Delaney, supra note 59 (suggesting practical, more understandable defi- R
nition of “inure”).
31
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ception, which also applies here.225  IRS documents addressing this
topic provide that, “the inurement prohibition does not preclude
members receiving some kind of benefits from the organization
such as newsletters and similar informative material.”226  Further-
more, the same publication states that the “profitability of the mem-
bers’ individual enterprises may be enhanced by the [association’s]
successful promotion of the common business interest.”227  Finally,
the IRS documentation indicates that inurement does, however, re-
sult from “an expenditure of organizational funds resulting in a
benefit which is beyond the scope of the benefits which logically
flow from the organization’s performance of its exempt
functions.”228
One such area where the NFL’s expenditures and activities re-
sult in benefits that do not flow from its exempt functions is the
League’s stadium funding scheme.229  Under this system, the NFL
negotiates new deals for stadiums that are financed by a combina-
tion of public money, NFL loans, and owner-provided financing.230
Although this may be an oversimplification of the financing activity,
it provides the backdrop for understanding that the NFL’s stadium
funding arrangement runs afoul of the inurement prohibition.231
When the NFL contributes money to stadium construction
projects in the form of interest-free loans, such contributions inure
225. For a further discussion addressing the incidental exception, see supra
notes 111-116 and accompanying text. R
226. Reilly, supra note 65, at K-16 (discussing that associations may provide R
members with some small, “incidental” benefits without running afoul of inure-
ment prohibition).
227. Id. (indicating that prohibited inurement does not result when associa-
tion engages in general activities that promote common business interests of all
members, regardless of potential positive impact such activities may have on profit-
ability of individual member’s businesses).
228. Id. (citing G.C.M. 38559 (Nov. 8, 1980) as example of inurement result-
ing from association providing members with benefits that exceed incidental
exception).
229. For discussion regarding the NFL’s possible violation of the inurement
prohibition as it pertains to stadium funding, see infra notes 230-232 and accompa- R
nying text.
230. See The NFL: Big Business with Big Tax Breaks, NPR (Jan. 18, 2014), http://
www.npr.org/2014/01/18/263767372/the-nfl-big-business-with-big-tax-breaks
(identifying various activities, such as negotiating stadium deals, as NFL functions
that may be classified as “administrative” or “organizational”).  Jeremy Spector,
outside tax counsel for the NFL, suggests that the league office may engage in
“administrative” and “organizational” activities without putting the league’s tax-ex-
empt status at risk. See also Delaney, supra note 59, at 17 (detailing, generally, R
NFL’s G3 stadium funding program).  In certain cases private-equity investments
may also provide funding. See id.
231. See Delaney, supra note 59, at 16-19 (arguing that NFL’s stadium funding R
program improperly inures to benefit of members, specifically team owners).
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to the benefit of the member teams, specifically the owners of those
teams.232  The League would likely argue that these stadium fund
contributions are valid general promotional activities, which, at
most, produce incidental benefits.233  The problem with this view,
however, is that it ignores the basic realities that funds are limited,
and that the renovation or construction of a new stadium for one
team comes at the expense of other member NFL teams.234  Such
an unequal distribution of funds violates the inurement
prohibition.235
Another potentially problematic area for the NFL concerns the
billions of dollars the League collects in the form of “TV rights fees,
postseason revenue and shared ticket revenue from visiting
teams.”236  According to the NFL, these billions of dollars are sim-
ply collected by the League Office and distributed to the teams,
where such money is taxed.237  Although the NFL does not believe
that such collection and distribution of funds is problematic, this
activity should be characterized as inurement.238
232. See id. (arguing that team owners benefit from NFL’s stadium funding
program); see also The NFL’s New Stadium Fund Explained (Sort of), FIELD OF SCHEMES
(July 26, 2011), http://www.fieldofschemes.com/news/archives/2011/07/4619_
post_32.html (detailing, generally, that NFL’s new stadium funding program,
which replaced old G3 system, will take 1.5% of NFL revenues and contribute such
funds to construction or renovation projects of select stadiums throughout NFL).
233. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-16 (stating that inurement prohibition does R
not prohibit associations from generally promoting common business interest of
its members, which may lead to some incidental benefit for members and mem-
bers’ businesses).
234. See Stadium Geek Week: G3 Financing, FOOTBALLPHDS.COM (July 19, 2011),
http://www.footballphds.com/2011/07/19/stadium-geek-week-g3-financing/ (an-
swering basic questions regarding NFL’s previous stadium funding scheme (titled
“G3”) and specifically noting that after Meadowlands Stadium construction
started, no funds remained for distribution to other teams).
235. See Reilly, supra note 65, at K-16 (indicating that organizations who pro- R
vide benefits to some members at expense of other members violate inurement
prohibition).
236. Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (citing that in NFL’s most recent tax form, R
$4.3 billion were collected by NFL and distributed to member teams).
237. See Dosh, supra note 8 (discussing comments from NFL representative R
regarding NFL’s business activities and distribution of revenues among member
teams).
238. See Maul, supra note 65, at 219-20 ’ (discussing how NFL’s revenue shar- R
ing plan benefits individual shareholders (team owners) and disqualifies NFL from
501(c)(6) status); see also Reilly, supra note 65, at K-15 (discussing that “distribution R
of accumulated income to members may constitute inurement, which would dis-
qualify an organization from exemption”).  Generally 501(c)(6) organizations may
only make cash distributions if such distributions “represent no more than a reduc-
tion in dues or contributions previously paid to the organization to supports its
activities.” See id.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent decision to overturn
the NFL’s longstanding single entity status for antitrust purposes
has lead critics to suggest that the NFL “should also not be consid-
ered a single entity for tax purposes.”239  Specifically, critics claim
that the NFL team owners are like “private franchise holders of a
business” who directly benefit from the business that is “NFL foot-
ball.”240  That is, due to the League’s revenue sharing plan, when
the League increases its overall revenues from national television
deals, each individual owner receives the benefit of increased dis-
tributed revenues as well.241  Based on the benefits enjoyed by par-
ticular individuals as a result of the NFL’s revenue sharing plan, the
NFL should fail the seventh and final requirement for tax-
exemption.242
IV. CONCLUSION
The IRS and courts provide that associations who wish to qual-
ify for 501(c)(6) status must meet all of the requirements outlined
in I.R.C. 501(c) and the relevant Treasury Regulations.243  As
demonstrated in the discussion above, it is clear that the NFL fails
at least one, if not most, of those requirements.244  Specifically, the
close relationship between the NFL and affiliated for-profit entities
calls into question whether: (1) the NFL is organized for profit; (2)
the NFL is engaging in business ordinarily conducted for profit;
and (3) the NFL performs particular services for its member
teams.245  Furthermore, the NFL does not improve any line of busi-
239. Maul, supra note 65, at 219 (positing that NFL should not be considered R
single entity for either antitrust or tax purposes); see also generally Am. Needle, Inc.
v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (holding that NFL is made up of distinct economic
entities (teams) that can have differing economic interests and can violate § 1 of
Sherman Act).
240. Maul, supra note 65, at 219 (suggesting that NFL team owners can be R
compared to private franchise holders).
241. See id. at 219-20 (explaining that NFL team owners receive financial ben-
efits in terms of increasing amounts of shared revenues when NFL increases overall
revenues).
242. See id. (arguing that NFL team owners do benefit from NFL’s earnings,
which constitutes inurement and should disqualify league from 501(c)(6) tax-ex-
empt status).
243. For a discussion outlining the requirements an association must satisfy to
qualify for 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status, see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying R
text.
244. For a detailed discussion suggesting that the NFL fails to satisfy some of
the requirements under the applicable seven-prong test, see supra notes 71-242 R
and accompanying text.
245. For a discussion addressing whether the NFL is organized for profit, see
supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion regarding R
whether the NFL engages in business ordinarily conducted for profit, see supra
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ness and thus also does not resemble a chamber of commerce or
board of trade.246  Finally, the League’s monetary practices, includ-
ing its stadium-funding scheme and distribution of revenues, also
violate the applicable inurement prohibition.247
In light of these shortcomings, the IRS should not wait for
Congress to act and should revoke the NFL’s tax-exempt status.248
Not only would such action simply constitute application of the
black letter law, but many people also see it as the fairest course of
action from a policy perspective.249  And while the IRS reviews the
NFL’s case, it should also look at other sports leagues, such as the
National Hockey League and the PGA Tour, who currently benefit
from the same 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status.250  In the end, there
notes 102-140 and accompanying text.  For a detailed discussion addressing R
whether the NFL performs particular services for its member team, see supra notes
181-200 and accompanying text. R
246. For a discussion suggesting that the NFL does not improve any lines of
business, see supra notes 143-180 and accompanying text.  For a discussion address- R
ing whether the NFL constitutes either a chamber of commerce or board of trade,
see supra notes 201-217 and accompanying text. R
247. For a further discussion suggesting that the NFL’s questionable mone-
tary practices constitute inurement, see supra notes 218-242 and accompanying R
text.
248. See Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (suggesting that debate regarding fairness R
of tax code which provides tax exempt status to some groups while denying such
status to other groups “boils down to a tax policy decision for Congress”); see also
John Mariani, Should the NFL Pay Taxes? Petition Seeks to End League’s Federal Tax-
Exempt Status, SYRACUSE.COM (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/news/in-
dex.ssf/2013/10/should_the_nfl_pay_taxes_you_make_the_call.html (discussing
Woolard’s petition to revoke NFL’s status, as well as Sen. Coburn’s actions in Con-
gress, and asking if “Congress should blow the whistle on the NFL’s tax-exempt
status?”).
249. See Coburn Calls for End, supra note 28 (suggesting that although federal R
tax revenues to be obtained from revoking NFL’s tax-exempt status are unknown,
it is clear that “as a matter of fairness” NFL should lose its 501(c)(6) status).
Until public attitudes change, those at the top of the pro-football pyramid will
keep getting away with whatever they can. This is troubling not just because ordi-
nary people are taxed so a small number of NFL owners and officers can live as
modern feudal lords and ladies. It is troubling because athletics are supposed to
set an example – and the example being set by the NFL is one of selfishness.
Football is the king of sports. Should the favorite sport of the greatest nation really
be one whose economic structure is based on inequality and greed?
Easterbrook, supra note 33. R
Would taxing the NFL in line with its actual profitable purpose impact
America in a major way? Most likely not – even if [Sen.] Coburn’s esti-
mates are correct, “at least $91 million” can be carved up rather quickly
by any government. But fair is fair, and the NFL’s claim that it operates at
anything but a near bullet-proof money machine is ludicrous a[t] best,
and near criminal at worst.
Farrar, supra note 2. R
250. See Mariani, supra note 248 (discussing that Sen. Coburn’s new stand- R
alone bill (PRO Sports Act) would impact National Hockey League and PGA Tour,
in addition to NFL, as those two organizations also currently file as nonprofit orga-
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appears to be no compelling reason for the NFL, the most profita-
ble sports league in the world, to be tax-exempt.251
Christian Schmied*
nizations); see also Schrotenboer, supra note 6 (stating that “for decades . . . the R
PGA Tour and NHL haven’t been required to pay [federal income taxes]”).
251. See Delaney, supra note 59, at 9 (suggesting that there is “no logical ex- R
planation” as to why NFL has tax-exempt status); see also NFL’s Exempt Status,
supra note 62 (suggesting, sarcastically, that NFL’s tax-exempt status is justified as R
NFL, and NHL for that matter, does not constitute sports or business association,
but rather tax-exempt religion).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. summa
cum laude, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2009.
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